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I. INTRODUCTION
Will these parties reach an agreement? Inside the heads of most mediators,
this question arises at one point or another. Mediators differ on the ways in
which they go about answering that question. Some explore the question very
systematically, using a sophisticated model for analyzing the substance of the
dispute. Some place primary importance on the behavior or communication
patterns of the disputants. Others base their assessments largely on instinct,
experience, or "gut feel." Still others explore the answer only at the subconscious
level, and some may fight the urge to answer it altogether. Most mediators at
least consider this question-forming a prediction about the likelihood of
settlement in a case.
This Article explores how mediators treat the question of prediction-their
internal assessment of how likely it is that the disputants will reach an agreement.
It begins by offering a definition of "prediction" in the context of mediation and
offers a framework for understanding the basic dynamics under consideration.
Rational and non-rational influences on parties' behavior make prediction an
uncertain enterprise in virtually all cases. Recognizing this, this Article then
considers potential impacts if a mediator were to share herI predictions with the
disputants. To do this, this Article explores four different "stories, ' 2 each of
I As a convention for handling gender-linked pronouns, I will consistently refer to the
mediator as "she," and to each of the parties as "he."
2 The "stories" are simplifications of actual mediations I have conducted, observed, or
learned about during interviews with practicing mediators. Each has been cleansed of any
information that might identify the actual parties or nature of the dispute. As you will note,
the information that has been removed-most particularly the substance of the disputes-is
not important. What is important is the dynamic observed by the mediators, their predictive
comments, and the apparent impact of those comments.
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which describes a mediation in which a mediator formulates a prediction and
then signals it to the disputants. The disputes considered in each story have been
simplified for purposes of illustration and reflection.
The first two stories consider accurate mediator predictions-instances when
a mediator's prediction matches the ultimate outcome of the mediation. In the
first story, the mediator formulates an "optimistic prediction"-a belief that the
case will settle. She shares it with the parties, and in fact, the case winds up
settling. In the second story, the mediator forms and shares a "pessimistic
prediction" in a case that eventually fails to settle. What might explain the
mediator's accurate prediction? One possible answer is a passive assessment of
prediction. It suggests that the mediator is a well-informed observer who has
simply run her calculations correctly. The sharing of her conclusion, by this
explanation, has no impact on the outcome of the dispute itself. A second
possible answer is a causal one. In the first story, it suggests that by sharing her
prediction, the mediator induced behavior from the parties that was conducive
to settlement. That is, the fact that the mediator in the first story shared an
optimistic prediction with the parties made their settlement more likely than it
would have been without any prediction signal. In the second story, it is possible
that the mediator's pessimistic prediction signal caused, in part, the non-
settlement she predicted.
Perhaps more interesting are the final two stories, in which the mediator's
prediction proves to be inaccurate. The third story involves a mediator who
thought that a case would not settle, told the parties as much, and then watched
as the parties arrived at an agreement. In the final story, a mediator believes that
a case is destined to settle and shares that belief with the parties, only to see the
talks fall apart. In seeking to explain why this might happen, it is important to
recognize that the mediator may have merely miscalculated the likelihood of
settlement. The information on which a mediator bases her prediction is
tremendously complex, and it is not static throughout a mediation. Mediators will
sometimes predict poorly. It is also possible, however, that the mediator's
prediction signal caused a change in the parties' behavior. This Article explores
several reasons why parties may, upon hearing a mediator's pessimistic
prediction, change their behavior in a way that is conducive to settlement.
Similarly, there are reasons why optimistic predictions may, counter-intuitively,
encourage behavior that makes settlement less likely.
Each of the above stories assumes that the mediator signals to the parties the
prediction she actually holds. In practice, there may be reasons mediators will
choose to send a false signal-suggesting that settlement is likely when in fact
the mediator believes it is unlikely, or vice versa. While there are a number of
possible explanations for mediators' misrepresentations around prediction, there
are also considerable ethical and functional implications of such decisions.
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While recognizing that the inquiry around mediation prediction is only in its
infancy, this Article offers several observations about the practice of prediction
formulation and prediction signaling. How certain must a mediator be before she
formulates or signals a prediction? At what point in the mediation should she
consider predictions? What options does she have in formulating her predictive
statement or signal if she wants to maximize the impact of her prediction?
Ultimately, this Article suggests that prediction can constitute an appropriate and
helpful service a mediator might provide to disputants.
Prediction practice is certainly not a central part of current mainstream
conceptions of mediation. It is one of many stones yet unturned regarding
mediation practice. Still, there are a number of predictable objections to its
inclusion or consideration within the concept of "good mediation." This Article
explores some of those objections to mediator prediction, offers some tentative
responses, and suggests the need for further exploration of the concept of
mediators' predictions.
1-. "PREDICTION" DEFINED
For purposes of this Article's analysis, the term "prediction" refers to one
very specific thing: the mediator's assessment of the likelihood of settlement.
Prediction does not mean a guess as to the particular outcome or point of
settlement (e.g., "I think the parties will settle on $30,000"). Prediction also does
not intend to speak to what outcome would likely be imposed by a non-party in
the absence of a resolution (e.g., "I think a court would grant the defendant
$10,000"). Instead, the term prediction describes only the mediator's sense of
whether or not the parties will arrive at a settlement in the dispute.
This Article describes prediction within the context of the mediation of a
discrete and finite dispute. This is certainly not the only context in which
mediation is appropriate. It is not even the only context in which prediction may
be appropriate. This Article restricts its discussion to such contexts, however,
because it is easiest to describe the dynamics in terms of basic frameworks from
the traditional negotiation literature. For example, the analysis in this Article
does not aim to consider a situation like a marriage or the formation of a
partnership because it would be senseless to speak of the outcome in such
situations in terms of settlement.3 Instead, this Article considers disputes or other
discrete transactions in which the parties may or may not reach a resolution on
the full set of issues in question. Such situations may permit the formulation of
3 Prediction might apply, however, in the context of divorce-a situation in which it
would be reasonable to believe that all of the outstanding issues in dispute had been
resolved.
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a clean prediction-the assessment of the likelihood that the parties will, in fact,
reach a resolution on all of those issues.
A. Formulating Predictions
There are many different bases on which a mediator might formulate her
prediction. Indeed, there has been no empirical research on the descriptive
question of how practicing mediators assess the likelihood of settlement in
various situations. Still, it is safe to imagine that a mediator's training, style, and
stance toward mediation will color the way in which she formulates a prediction.
Some mediators will favor heavily analytic approaches to considering the
substance of the dispute. Others will look more closely at the ways in which the
parties are framing the dispute, how they are communicating with each other, and
the degree to which they appear intransigent. This Article does not aim to answer
the question of how mediators should formulate predictions, and instead
recognizes that there may be many different leading indicators of the likelihood
of settlement.
To illustrate the concept of prediction in the context of a mediation, the
example immediately following is modestly analytic in nature. The example does
not provide any information about the mediator's assessment of the affect
between the parties, their communication patterns, or any other non-quantifiable
aspect of bargaining. In that sense, the example is more limited than the methods
most practicing mediators use to formulate predictions, and it is not intended to
be normative. Instead, it is designed to offer a simple basis for illustrating the
concept of prediction.
Consider an overly simplified dispute4 in which there are two parties: I and
A. Party 1I is the plaintiff, the one making a claim for payment. Party A is the
defendant, the one from whom Party II is seeking payment. In this case, assume
also that there is only one isilie: the amount of money A is to pay I. All other
4 The concept of prediction may apply to mediation in a deal-making context as well
as to dispute resolution. Currently, however, mediation is most commonly practiced in a
dispute resolution forum, and this context provides the simplest examples to illustrate
prediction formulation and signaling. For an interesting treatment of the question of neutrals
serving as brokers in deal-making contexts, see Scott Peppet, Alternative Deal-Making: The
Use of Lawyer-Neutrals in Transactions (Jan. 30, 2000) (discussion draft, on file with
author).
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terms have been fixed or are irrelevant. Assume that the question is purely a
distributive one. 5
For purposes of setting up a simple preliminary case for consideration,
assume also that 1 and A have not spoken with each other in advance of the
mediation. The parties, therefore, know nothing about each other's perceptions
of the case. Both Il and A have spoken with the mediator privately, however, and
each has candidly6 revealed his perspective on the dispute. During those
conversations, each party revealed his reservation value-the price point beyond
which he would be unwilling to make an agreement. 7 I will label the plaintiff's
and the defendant's reservation values RVI and RVA, respectively.
Imagine that the information collected by the mediator revealed the situation
described in Figure 1. The plaintiff, -I, would be willing to settle the case for any
amount greater than $200,000. The defendant, A, would be willing to pay up to
$400,000 to settle the case.
Figure 1. A Large ZOPA
$100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 $500,000
RVn RVA
Theoretically, 121 and A would be happy with any agreement
between $200,000 and $400,000
5 This case description parallels, in most respects, what Howard Raiffa refers to as "the
canonical case of distributive bargaining." HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION 56 (1982). It differs from Raiffa's highly structured bargaining scenario in that
it does not provide for probabilistic distributions of the parties' reservation values. I have
never encountered a case meeting these simplifying assumptions in my own experience, and
I believe they must be rare. Nevertheless, such constraints on the baseline hypothetical
permit cleaner calculations, and I will adopt them for these purposes.
6 This Article will consider later the complications posed by partial disclosure or
intentional misrepresentation. For now, assume that the parties disclose fully and honestly
those things indicated in exchanges between the mediator and parties.
7 For a useful, introductory discussion of the term "reservation value," see ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: How LAWYERS HELP CLIENTS CREATE VALUE IN
NEGOTIATION (forthcoming 2000); see also DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE
MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITVE GAIN 119
(1986). Some authors have adopted the term "reservation price" to signify the same thing.
RAIFFA, supra note 5, at 44-5 1.
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In this case, the "zone of possible agreement" (ZOPA)8 between the parties'
reservation values is large. Any settlement option between $200,000 and
$400,000 would be superior to both parties' reservation values.
Is this case likely to settle? If one assumes that the parties are economically
rational, that the dispute is a single issue distributive case and that no additional
information or issues will emerge, a case like this one should settle. It would be
reasonable for a mediator with access to the information described in Figure 1
to formulate an optimistic prediction--one that suggests that settlement is likely.9
In a mediation involving human parties, rather than simplified and
economically rational actors, a mediator might reasonably conclude that she does
not have enough information to formulate a prediction with certainty.
Psychological or emotional issues may prevent the parties from objectively
evaluating the merits of a proposal.10 The parties may lack the experience or
creativity to discover the full range of possible settlement options. One party or
the other may lock himself into a value-claiming negotiation strategy that
precludes commitment on an otherwise efficient and acceptable proposal.'1
There may be principal-agent issues or constituents' interests that cloud the
calculation. 12 Organizational or structural constraints may prevent appropriate
communication or decision-making processes. 13 The interpersonal dynamic
8 Howard Raiffa originally employed the terms "zone of agreement' or "potential zone
of agreement' to describe the range within which the parties might agree on an option that
is superior to each party's reservation value. RAFfA, supra note 5, at 44-51. This Article
adopts the label "zone of possible agreement" or "ZOPA," as described by Professor
Mnookin. MNoOKiN Er AL., supra note 7.
9 The use of a normative label such as "optimistic" or "pessimistic" to describe
mediation outcomes risks overstating the importance of settlement in a mediation context.
Indeed, some mediation scholars have suggested that a mediator who aims solely to produce
settlement risks inappropriately influencing parties' decisions and prejudicing parties'
interests. Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations: Piercing
the 'Grid' Lock, 24 FLA. ST. L. REv. 985, 991-92 (1997). I elect to use the terms here
because they strike me as the most elegant (word-efficient) way of communicating the
concepts of believing that a case will or will not settle.
10 Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS
TO CONFLicr RESOLUTION 26, 27-42 (Kenneth J. Aarow et al. eds., 1995).
11 The strategy of making commitments can yield important competitive advantages to
a bargainer, provided certain conditions are met. THOMAS SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONE=XCr 22-28 (1960). However, such commitments may also preclude further exploration
of options for joint gains.
12 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 73-91 (describing the negotiation tensions between
principals and agents).
13Robert H. Mnookin & Lee Ross, Introduction to BARRIERS TO CoNFLicT
RESOLUrION, supra note 10, at 19-20.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
between the parties may not be conducive to settlement. There simply may not
be a "positive mood" in the room. 14 And the list goes on. Any of these factors
could create a condition in which the parties would fail to agree to a settlement
option which appears rationally to be superior to both parties' reservation values.
Absent full information about this range of factors, a mediator might be less than
certain about her assessment of the likelihood that the case will settle.
Consider the situation if the parties had different reservation values, ones
that created no ZOPA. 15 In this scenario, A is willing to pay up to $200,000 to
settle the claim, while 1-I will not accept less than $400,000.
Figure 2. No ZOPA
$100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 $500,000
RVA RVn
No settlement options would be superior
to both parties' reservation values.
In this case, no possible settlement option would provide both parties with
more value than their walkaway alternatives. If this were a dispute between two
human negotiators, a mediator might consider whether one or both might later
change his reservation value, or whether there might be some way to create value
by adding issues beyond merely the amount of payment or through some other
14 Some experimenters have discussed the favorable impacts of a "positive mood" on
integrative performances by the parties. E.g., Peter J. Carnevale & Alice M. Isen, The
Influence of Positive Affect and Visual Access on the Discovery of Integrative Solutions in
Bilateral Negotiation, 37 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 2-4 (1986) (arguing
that positive affect promotes integrative bargaining behavior).
15 See infra fig. 2.
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means. 16 For now, however, assume that because of the single-issue nature of the
case, nothing will (or can) happen during the course of discussions between the
two parties that would create value 17 or affect the parties' reservation values. 18
Economically rational actors would not agree to something inferior to their own
reservation values, and they would produce no settlement in this case. It would
be entirely reasonable for a mediator in a case like the one described in Figure
2 to formulate a pessimistic prediction-one which concludes that it is unlikely
that the parties will reach an agreement.
Prediction is a function of the information available to a mediator at a given
point in time in the mediation. A mediator might formulate a prediction at the
very beginning of the mediation, but she would likely shift her prediction as
more information became available. As one experienced mediator noted during
an interview regarding a case that had just settled, "If you had asked me at 10
a.m. whether I thought this case was going to settle, I'd have told you there was
no way. At 2 p.m., I knew we were there, and by 2:30 we were writing up the
agreement." 19 Over the course of a mediation, information can shift in both
substance and availability. Only within the fiction of economists' visions of full
and complete information would it be sensible to speak of a single prediction
16 Zero-sum two-party cases are not the norm in the practice of mediation. Instead, most
involve opportunities for value creation or destruction. There may be multiple issues to be
resolved, presenting opportunities for value-creating trade. Parties may have differences (in
terms of risk, timing, prediction, capacity, etc.) that can be exploited to create value. For a
succinct treatment of the possible sources of value-creating opportunities, see MNOOKIN ET
AL., supra note 7, at 13-29; see also LAx & SEBENIUS, supra note 7, at 88-116. There may
also be ways in which settlement would create value by preventing future expenditure (e.g.,
on litigation or further mediation). As a result, a prediction formulation in a non-zero-sum
case would depend on a mediator having information about parties' interests, capabilities,
resources, preferences, and expectations, along with a sense of how they value various
settlement options and how they see their non-settlement alternatives. A mediator might also
discount the pessimistic picture described in Figure 2. by attributing it to strategic
misrepresentation by the parties. This Article treats the question of parties exaggerating their
reservation values in Part V.A.
17 If the parties were negotiating over multiple issues, for example, it might be possible
to arrive at an option package that would be satisfactory to both, even if the dollar term alone
were not. For purposes of this initial hypothetical, assume that there are no value-creating
opportunities between the parties.
18Reservation values are a function of parties' interests and their walkaway
alternatives. Because of this, reservation values shift during the course of a negotiation if a
party learns new information that causes him to reassess his own interests or his walkaway
alternative. For purposes of simplicity, in this early section, assume that there is no
information that will emerge to cause a change in the parties' reservation values.
19 Interview with Frank Sander, Associate Dean and Bussey Professor of Law, Harvard
Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Nov. 17, 1999).
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regarding a mediation. Instead, when speaking of prediction, it is important to
note that mediators formulate predictions in conditions of incomplete
information.
As mediators gain information, they may reasonably alter their predictions
about the likelihood of settlement. Returning to the dispute described above,20
imagine that the parties met privately with the mediator in advance of any direct
communication with each other. During that preliminary meeting, each party
candidly revealed his reservation value to the mediator. If HI revealed a
reservation value of $280,000 and A revealed a reservation value of $320,000,
the mediator would recognize the existence of a small ZOPA.21 See Figure 3.
Figure 3. A Small ZOPA
$100,000 $200,000 $300,000 $400,000 $500,000
RVrn RVA
Theoretically, HI and A would be willing to settle
on any amount between $280,000 and $320,000
At this point in time, a mediator might choose to formulate a prediction
about the likelihood of settlement. Some mediators in this circumstance might
hold an optimistic prediction, relying on the efficiency of the process to lead the
parties to an agreement within the existent ZOPA. Others might hold a
pessimistic prediction, believing that such a small amount of room in which to
bargain will make it unlikely that the parties will arrive at an agreement. In either
event, the prediction is based on limited-and therefore imperfect-information.
If additional information becomes available, the mediator's prediction would
likely shift. Imagine, for example, that following the parties' initial private
meeting with the mediator, the mediator and the parties gathered in a joint
meeting to hold preliminary talks. During the course of that initial conversation,
the mediator had an opportunity to observe some of the interpersonal dynamics
20 r and A are negotiating a settlement payment from A to rI. The only issue in
question is the amount of payment. I's only interest is in maximizing the amount of
payment, and A seeks only to minimize his payment to rI.
21 See infra fig. 3.
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between f" and A. Furthermore, I and A each tabled an initial offer or demand,
Dlr and DlA, respectively. At this point, if the mediator were trying to formulate
a prediction about the case, she would have three separate pieces of information.
She would still have data about the presence of a small ZOPA. Furthermore, she
would have a sense of the interpersonal dynamic between the parties, which she
could use to discount or inflate her assessment of the likelihood of settlement.
And finally, she and the parties would have the two initial offers.22 The
additional information regarding the parties' initial offers may also have a
considerable impact on mediators' predictions. Imagine, for example, the
condition created if the gap between Dlr and DIA were quite large. For example,
if 171 had demanded a payment of at least $470,000, and A had insisted on paying
no more than $130,000, the mediator might assess differently the likelihood of
settlement within the ZOPA between $280,000 and $320,000. See Figure 4.
Figure 4. Small ZOPA. High Initial Demands.
$130,000 $470,000
I I I
I I
D' RVn RVA D$280,000 $320,000
What are the prospects of settlement?
A mediator in this case might revise her prediction to make it more
pessimistic, based on the sizeable gap between the two parties' initial demands. 23
22 Only the initial offers would be "common knowledge" in the sense that there is an
infinite series of knowledge regarding the offers. A knows Dl,; H'1 knows DIA; A knows that
l knows DiA; and so on. Ian Ayres & Barry J. Nalebuff, Common Knowledge as a Barrier
to Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1631, 1631-34 (1997) (defining the concept of "common
knowledge" in the context of a mediated, two-party dispute). This is true only for the initial
offers because the other pieces of information are either subjective assessments regarding
the interpersonal dynamic between the parties or were revealed in confidence only to the
mediator (the parties' reservation values).
23 To some extent, a mediator in a case precisely like this one may augment her
assessment of the likelihood of settlement because the option falling directly at the mid-point
between the parties' initial demands falls within the narrow ZOPA. Even if there is no
objective criteria to support the construction of the initial demands, it is difficult for parties
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These demands may merely represent initial bargaining strategy, without
significant correlation to the parties' actual valuations in the case. On the other
hand, the initial demands may reflect the parties' aspiration levels. Parties with
relatively high or over-valued aspiration levels may be less likely to engage in
settlement-conducive behavior.24 Put simply, if H is hoping to receive $470,000
($190,000 more than her reservation value), it may be difficult for her to arrive
at an agreement for only $300,000 ($20,000 above her reservation value). The
same dynamic would be affecting A in this case. A mediator formulating a
prediction in this case might take the information about the two parties' sizeable
initial demands and reduce her prediction about the likelihood of settlement. If,
at some later point in the mediation, the parties forward a set of revised demands,
D2n and D2A the addition of that information would provide good reason for the
mediator to shift her prediction assessment again. Imagine, for example that D2n
and D2A were $340,000 and $260,000 respectively. 25 The mediator's prediction
at that point would almost certainly increase in optimism.
to avoid anchoring effects. LEIGH THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR
130-31 (1998). It is then common, though not necessarily advisable, for negotiators to focus
on mid-point solutions and to view them as fair. Id. at 19, 205-208. This section intends
primarily to treat the question of cases where the initial demands are far from each other and
may suggest the absence of a ZOPA to the parties-regardless of the symmetries in the
initial demands with respect to the actual ZOPA.
24 Aggressive aspiration tends to increase the time required for bargaining and makes
impasse more likely. DEAN G. PRuiTr ET AL., SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE,
AND SETTLEMENT 12-15 (1986) (claiming that impasse is more likely); Aimee Drolet et al.,
Thinking of Others: How Perspective Taking Changes Negotiators' Aspirations and
Fairness Perceptions as a Function of Negotiator Relationships, 20 BASIC AND APPLIED
Soc. PSYCHoL. 23, 24-5 (1998) (stating that settlement discussions take longer); Vandra L.
Huber & Margaret A. Neale, Effects of Self- and Competitor Goals on Performance in an
Interdependent Bargaining Task, J. OF APPLIED PSYCHoL 197, 197-203 (1987) (When both
sides have high, difficult to obtain aspiration levels, the likelihood of integrative behavior
is reduced). For a very interesting treatment of the effects of negotiator optimism, see
generally Hannah C. Riley & Robert J. Robinson, How High Can You Go?: Investigations
of the Perils and Benefits of Negotiator Optimism (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
25 See infra fig. 5.
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Figure 5. Small ZOPA. More Modest Follow-Up Demands.
$260,000 $340,000
D2A D2n ,II I' Il
I l I l
* .Ii I I
I I I
Di1 ' RVn RVA DIn
$130,000 $280,000 $320,000 $470,000
What are the prospects of settlement?
Regardless of the nature of the case in question, it is clear that the key to
formulating an accurate prediction is access to information. Mediators in practice
will never have access to all of the information that would be relevant to
formulating a perfectly accurate prediction. 26 As a result, the best that mediators
can hope to do at any stage of a mediation is formulate best-guess estimates
about the likelihood of settlement. Nothing is absolutely certain to settle until it
has settled.27 Similarly, there are no disputes that are absolutely certain not to
settle.28 As circumstances become more realistic (more complex and less static),
the need for probabilistic predictions becomes even clearer.
26 It would be difficult for a mediator to list all of the kinds of information she might
want to collect before making her assessment. Sheila Heen has suggegted that among the
data a mediator might seek would be the following: (1) statements p~rties made during
private caucuses, (2) parties' subjective senses of their BATNAs; (3) parties' skill at
understanding the other side, (4) the existence or absence of constituents who may be
locking in the negotiators, (5) the emotional content of the case, (6) the state of the
relationship, (7) the parties' ability and willingness to listen, (8) the parties' capacity to
problem-solve creatively, and (9) the existence or absence of agency issues. Interview with
Sheila Heen, Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, in Cambridge, Mass. (Apr. 24, 2000).
Surely her list is not exhaustive, but it illustrates the enormous complexity surrounding the
relevant information.
27 Yogi Berra once proclaimed, "It ain't over until it's over." PAUL DIcKSON,
BASEBALLS' GREATEST QUOTATIONs 43 (1991). The same ought to be said of mediations.
It is unfortunately common for deals to collapse just prior to their completion.
28 Roger Fisher has noted, for example, that describing the most seemingly unsolvable
disputes as "intractable" misses the circularity of the label. In his words, "they're only
intractable until someone resolves things." Interview with Roger Fisher, Samuel Williston
Professor emeritus, Harvard Law School, in Barcelona, Spain (July 20, 1998). Fisher prefers
to label such disputes as "protracted," recognizing that there is always some chance that the
dispute will not be indefinitely unresolved.
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Predictions are not binary (yes-no) judgments. Instead, they tend to be
probabilistic assessments of the likelihood that the parties will arrive at a
dispositive agreement. For a variety of good reasons, mediators are unlikely to
produce even perfectly precise probabilistic assessments of the likelihood of
settlement (31% likely or 84% likely).29 Instead, mediators' predictions are most
likely to be characterized with qualifiers that indicate the confidence with which
the mediator holds her prediction. A mediator may signal a prediction by saying
she is "extremely confident" that the case will settle, or she may say that she "has
serious concerns about the likelihood" that it will be resolved.30
Figure 6. Degrees of Certainty in Prediction
Extremely Unlikely Likely Extremely
Unlikely To Settle 7?? To Settle Likely
..)
B. Prediction Is Not "Evaluation"
There is an important distinction between the commonly discussed practice
of mediator "evaluation" and the idea of mediators formulating a prediction.
Because both involve an exchange of information from the mediator to the
parties, there is some risk that the two will be confused. Analytically, and in
practice, the two are distinct.
29 Note, however, that outside observers may also produce estimates regarding the
likelihood of settlement. For example, in discussing the appointment of Judge Posner to
mediate the Microsoft antitrust suit in 1999, a Business Week analyst reported that a
Brookings Institution outside analyst "put the odds of a mediated settlement at only about
20%." Mike France, A Microsoft Settlement? Don't Bet On It, BusINEss WEEK, Dec. 6, 1999,
at 50.
30 While a mediator may have an understanding of the meaning she attaches to various
labels or qualifiers, it is extremely likely that the parties will not attach identical meaning.
When a mediator says that settlement is "likely," does that mean she believes it is 51%
likely, 60% likely, or 80% likely? There is often a gap between a predictor (whether a
mediator or a client's attorney) prose and the percentages the listener attaches to that prose.
Jeff Seul, An Introduction to Litigation Analysis, Lecture at Harvard Law School (January
6,2000).
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Evaluation within mediation is a practice, adopted by some percentage of
mediators, in which the mediator assesses the likely outcome of non-settlement
(typically litigation) and communicates her assessment to the parties. The
practice has been the subject of a lively exchange among practitioners and
scholars alike.31 This Article does not intend in any way to address the merits or
risks of evaluation as a practice.32 What is important to understand is that the key
component of evaluation is that it centers on the mediator's assessment of the
parties' BATNAs.33
Prediction also involves a treatment of parties' BATNAs as one of its
components.34 It is important to note, however, that it is the parties' assessment
of their BATNAs that is important, not the mediator's adsessfiient. Indeed, it
would be entirely possible for a mediator to have absolutely no idea what the
non-settlement alternative in a case would be and still to make an accurate
prediction about the likelihood of settlement. Similarly, a mediator could
disagree entirely with the parties' assessments of their BATNAs and still
accurately predict the likelihood of settlement, as long as she had access to the
parties' perceptions of their BATNAs. Settlement is not a function of an
objective measure of the attractiveness of a BATNA. Rather, it-hinges on each
party's assessment of the benefits and costs of not settling as compared to his
valuation of the best available settlement option or option package.
This Article defines mediator prediction as an assessment of the likelihood
of settlement. It is neither a guess at the likely terms of a settlement nor an
estimate of the parties' non-settlement alternatives. Instead, prediction is simply
a guess as to the probability of the fact of a settlement, regardless of its terms.
31 For a useful exploration and critique of several facets of the debate, see Stulberg,
supra note 9, at 985-1005.
32 It may be interesting to apply the critiques of evaluative mediator practice to the
notion of mediators signaling predictions. However, such an analysis falls outside of the
scope of this initial Article.
33 For a discussion of BATNA, see generally ROGE FISnER WaLUAM URY, GETING TO
YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHOUT GIvING IN 104 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).
The term BATNA has gained widespread acceptance and use within the negotiation
literature. See, e.g., RAiFFA, supra note 5, at 45; MAX BAzERMAN & MARGARET NEALE,
NEGOTIATNG RATIONALLY 67-70 (1992).
34 Recall that this is only one of the variables considered in the section above.
Prediction cannot be made by reference to BATNA assessments alone. In non-zero-sum
circumstances, prediction also requires, at a minimum, an understanding of each party's
interests and of the range of possible options or option packages. In the real world,
prediction would also consider a host of variables linked to the human disputants and their
interactions.
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C. Prediction Signaling
There is an important distinction between formulating a prediction and
sharing that prediction with the disputants. The analysis above considers the
question of what a mediator's prediction might be in a given case-a concept this
Article refers to as "prediction formulation." Until this point, the Article has
treated prediction as an entirely internal process, as something the mediator
figures out for herself. Many mediators engage in some form of inquiry about the
likelihood that a particular case will settle, but then keep their conclusions to
themselves.
At some point and under some conditions, some mediators may choose to
communicate their predictions about a case to the parties. This Article refers to
the process of communicating the content of a prediction as "signaling."
"Prediction signaling" can take one of at least three forms-direct intentional,
implicit intentional, and implicit unintentional signaling.
Direct intentional signaling is the least subtle, most conspicuous form of
signaling. In it, a mediator tells the parties her prediction in a straight-forward
manner (e.g., "I've been thinking about this case and from what I've seen and
now understand, I don't think this is going to settle.; based on what you've each
told me, I'm confident that you'll be able to reach an agreement."). The two
important features of this method of signaling are that the mediator intends for
the parties to know her prediction and the mediator communicates that prediction
directly and unambiguously.
Implicit intentional signaling involves more subtle means of communication,
relying on the parties to make meaning out of a mediator's behavior. A mediator
might intend to signal something about her prediction through the particular way
she frames a discussion, the demeanor she exhibits, the processes she adopts, the
scheduling she suggests, and so on. It is easy to imagine that a mediator who
believes strongly that settlement is likely (a mediator with an optimistic
prediction) would react differently on each of these matters than would a
mediator who believed that no settlement would be produced (a mediator with
a pessimistic prediction). Obviously, there is a risk inherent in implicit methods
of signaling that parties will misinterpret the content of the prediction. 35
Analytically, however, it is important to note that the implicit intentional method
of prediction signaling encompasses all of the efforts of a mediator who wants
35 If a mediator wants to schedule another meeting right away, then does that suggest
that she holds an optimistic prediction or a pessimistic one? Or does it have nothing at all
to do with prediction? What if the mediator is particularly encouraging of the parties? What
if she suggests bringing principals into the discussions? What if she suggests omitting
principals from the discussions? There is considerable risk that parties will watch mediators'
actions and interpret the actions in a manner different than the mediator intended.
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the parties to understand her prediction but does not want to communicate her
prediction in a concrete or direct way.
A third and important way in which mediators' predictions are
communicated is through implicit, unintentional means. All of the activities and
behaviors described in the section above are present whether or not a mediator
intends to be communicating anything about a prediction. A mediator will have
a demeanor of some sort, will make process decisions, will frame issues, and will
interact with the parties even if she does not want the parties to know anything
about her prediction in the case. Despite this, there is some risk that parties will
be looking for (and finding) signals, whether or not the mediator is intending to
send them.
The balance of this Article focuses on direct intentional signaling. While
there may be good reason to avoid direct signaling, any implicit method of
signaling leaves considerable room for a disconnect between the mediator's
prediction signal and the parties' understanding of the mediator's prediction
signal.
III. FouR STORIES OF MEDIATOR PREDICTIONS
A. Accurately Predicting Settlement
"The parties were actively engaged, and the dispute lent itself well to
creative solutions. I let them know that I thought this case was right for
mediation and that we were on track They easily reached an agreement, with
minimal acrimony."
The first story in this Article is one in which the following occurs: (a) the
parties and mediator begin their discussions; (b) at some point, the mediator
formulates an optimistic prediction; (c) the mediator signals an optimistic
prediction; and (d) eventually, the parties settle. Not all mediations progress this
way, but some clearly do. For purposes of this story, assume that it did unfold
this way. Why would this happen?
There are two fundamental possibilities regarding the combination of an
optimistic prediction signal and the fact that the parties reached settlement. In
one explanation, the parties largely ignore the optimistic prediction signal-or
at least they do not alter their behavior because of it. I refer to this explanation
as including an "inconsequential signal." In the other explanation, the optimistic
prediction signal creates a change in the way the parties handle the dispute. I
label this phenomenon the "influential signal."
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1. Inconsequential Signal
Figure 7. Story One - Inconsequential Signal
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Some prediction signals are inconsequential, meaning they do not alter the
way in which the mediation or negotiation in question unfolds. It would be as if
the mediator never signaled her prediction or signaled it in such a way that the
parties knew nothing about it. By analogy, if I pick up the phone and place a
(legal) wager on the next game, betting that the home team will win, I am
signaling my prediction about the outcome. It is extremely unlikely, however,
that the fact of my prediction will alter the way the home team plays the
upcoming game. My wager or prediction will have been inconsequential.
In this case, the mediator's optimistic prediction signal may have been
inconsequential. For example, in some cases, it is patently obvious to all
involved that a settlement is forthcoming or even imminent. To have someone
name that fact out loud may do nothing to change the march toward settlement.
To some extent, parties may experience such a prediction as helpful and
encouraging because it reinforces previously held beliefs. Alternatively, parties
may find it annoying or irrelevant to have someone name what is already
obvious. 36 In either event, an optimistic prediction signal in a case that settles
may have been causally unrelated to the fact of settlement.
36 For example, building jigsaw puzzles was a part of my family's holiday tradition.
One year, my cousins and I worked for days on a particularly large puzzle. When we were
within a dozen or so pieces of finishing this jigsaw puzzle, my uncle walked by and observed
our progress. At that point, he said, "I think you guys should be able to finish up this puzzle
sometime soon." Our reactions to his declaration ranged from amusement to indifference to
mild annoyance, but it did not affect the way in which we went about completing the puzzle.
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2. Influential Signal
Figure 8. Story One - Influential Signal
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Some prediction signals are "influential" in that they have an effect on the
way the parties behave in the mediation and, therefore, affect the outcome of the
mediation.37 The parties may credit the impressions of the mediator because they
stem from one who is well-informed about the circumstances and is fairly
unbiased. It would be reasonable for the parties to change their behavior based
on a declaration from such a well-respected source. By analogy, if I am the coach
of a little league team and I tell my team that I think they are going to win the
game, my comment could have an effect on the way they play the game. For
example, they may believe me and my prediction, and become more relaxed or
more confident. In that sense, my optimistic prediction signal may have
influenced the outcome about which I was predicting.
In this case, it is possible that the mediator's optimistic prediction signal had
an influence on the way the parties behaved, making it more likely that the case
would settle (and that the prediction would come true). There are at least four
ways in which these effects might be explained.
37 Predictive statements may also have an effect on the behavior of the mediator. If a
mediator makes a public statement about the likelihood of settlement, her statement may
affect her decision-making, if not her perceptions. With an optimistic prediction signal, in
particular, a mediator might feel pressure to then see that the parties arrive at a settlement
because she had already indicated that she believed a settlement was forthcoming. For
purposes of this analysis, I ignore this possibility, using the assumption that a mediator will
always engage in her best efforts to serve the disputing parties in an appropriate way. I
acknowledge, however, that mediators' prediction signals may create additional (pre-
commitment) incentives for mediators.
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First, an optimistic prediction signal may create a pro-settlement influence
merely because it induces the parties to stay engaged in the mediation. If a party
is considering withdrawal from a mediation, it would likely be because he saw
no value in continuing, no prospect for settlement. An optimistic prediction
signal from the mediator suggests that a ZOPA exists and that settlement should
occur. Assuming that the transaction costs of involvement are not excessively
high, a party who receives a credible optimistic prediction would have little
incentive to withdraw. An optimistic prediction signal, therefore, may make
settlement more likely because it can keep parties "at the table," and engaged in
the mediation.38
Second, an optimistic prediction may serve as a settlement-inducing
influence because it may be received by the parties as a "celebration" of their
capacities or efforts. Some scholars have noted that groups or individuals may
perform better at a particular task if they are told that they are good at doing that
task. This process of indicating to individuals or groups that they are skilled at
a particular task is referred to as celebration. 39 To some extent, an optimistic
prediction signal may serve as a celebration of the parties' capacities and their
problem-solving skills, thereby making it more likely that they will arrive at a
settlement.
A third potential source of influence related to an optimistic prediction signal
is the chance that it will create an incentive for the parties to "please" the
mediator-or at least not to disappoint her. Some parties may defer to the
mediator's assessment of what is possible and may even feel a heightened sense
of urgency about achieving that outcome. This impact would clearly not be
experienced by all parties, but there is at least a chance that some parties will
perceive the mediator with such a degree of esteem or deference that they would
alter their behavior in order to "live up to" the standard articulated by the
mediator.
Finally, an optimistic prediction signal may alter the parties' behavior in a
dispute by legitimizing the actions the parties have taken up to the point of the
38 Lee Ross recently recounted a experiment that he conducted involving several
different groups, each engaging in the same difficult task (predicting the next U.S.
President). Initially, only a few of the groups successfully completed the assigned task.
However, after Ross offered encouragement to the groups-telling them that past groups had
been able to successfully complete the task-a significant percentage of the groups returned
to the task and completed it successfully. Lee Ross, Presentation at The Lawyer As Problem-
Solver Workshop (Apr. 8, 2000). To some extent, there may be parallels between these
effects and those observed when judges issue "dynamite charges" to juries that are
deadlocked.
39 Bruce M. Patton, Address at the Training for Trainers Seminar, Harvard Law School
(June 14, 1992); see also Richard H. Lee, The Couple's Therapist as Coaching Double in
a Model Encounter (May 29, 1992), at http://people.ne.mediaone.net/ricklee/lee92.html.
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prediction. An optimistic prediction is a projection into the future. The parties
have not already arrived at a settlement-the mediator is merely predicting that
they will. One part of the data a mediator relies on to make her prediction is the
behavior of the parties up to that point. If the parties are engaging in destructive
patterns of behavior, a mediator would be unlikely to hold an optimistic
prediction because it is virtually impossible to hold an optimistic prediction if the
parties' behavior is viewed as insurmountably destructive. Indeed, it is possible
that the parties will receive a mediator's optimistic prediction as an indication
that their behaviors are appropriate and consistent with settlement. In that sense,
an optimistic prediction may make settlement more likely because it implicitly
highlights and encourages pro-settlement behaviors from the parties.
It is difficult to predict the impacts of signaling an optimistic prediction. An
optimistic prediction signal may have a self-fulfilling effect. That is, it may be
influential, causing the parties to adopt behaviors conducive to settlement. At the
same time, it may have no impact on the parties whatsoever. This section does
not intend to predict or even define the full range of possible impacts of signaling
an optimistic prediction. Instead, it merely suggests that there may be at least two
explanations (the inconsequential and the influential) for a case like the first
story, in which a mediator signals an optimistic prediction and a settlement
follows.
B. Accurately Predicting Non-Settlement
"I could tell early on that this wasn't going anywhere. The parties seemed
incapable of working together, and the nature of the dispute in question made
it difficult to find any common ground. I told them I wasn't optimistic, and
eventually we called off the mediation. "
The second story of mediator prediction and its impact is one in which (a)
the parties and mediator begin their discussions; (b) at some point, the mediator
formulates a Pessimistic prediction; (c) the mediator signals a Pessimistic
prediction; and (d) eventually, the participants call off the mediation without
settlement. As with the first story, there are two possible explanations regarding
the combination of a pessimistic prediction and a non-settlement. The signal may
be inconsequential or influential.
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1. Inconsequential Signal
Figure 9. Story Two - Inconsequential Signal
A pessimistic prediction signal may have no bearing on the fact that the
parties reached no settlement. As with the Las Vegas visitor placing a wager on
the outcome of an activity which is unaffected by the content of the wager,40 a
mediator's pessimistic prediction signal may have had no impact on the fact that
the case did not settle. For example, imagine that a mediator learns that the
parties' preferences and BATNAs produce a dynamic in which there is no
ZOPA. Such a condition was described above in Figure 2. In such a case, the
parties were destined not to settie, and they would have reached non-settlement
whether or not the mediator signaled her own pessimism about the case. The
same might flow from a situation in which the mediator assesses the parties'
behavior to be so inalterably destructive that no settlement would be created,
even if economically rational actors might prefer to settle. Some cases are so
plainly destined not to settle that the insertion of a mediator's pessimistic
prediction has no impact on the parties' behavior or on the outcome of the
mediation.
40 This assumes, of course, that the gaming facility in question has not "fixed" the
otherwise uncertain event or equipment in some way that would cause it to deviate from a
purely random outcome.
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2. Influential Signal
Figure 10. Story Two - Influential Signal
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As with the optimistic prediction signal described in the first story, it is
possible that the mediator's pessimistic prediction signal in this story had an
influence over the parties' behavior in a way that made settlement less likely.
The most obvious aspect of the settlement dynamic which may be impacted by
a pessimistic prediction signal is the parties' willingness to stay actively engaged
in the mediation process. No mediator can create a settlement without the
consent of the parties. If the parties choose to disengage from the mediation
process, it ends without settlement.
Why might parties withdraw from a mediation if a mediator signals a
Pessimistic prediction? One reason is that mediations involve transaction costs.
Mediators' fees, the lawyers' fee structures, and the opportunity costs of the
principals all attach costs to each extra hour or day of the mediation. If a party
saw no return from that investment, he would reasonably disengage from the
process and walk to whatever alternative he has to mediation. A second
possibility stems from the psychological and relationship costs of being involved
in a protracted mediation or negotiation. In some contexts, parties may consider
the process of being involved in a dispute so unfavorably that they would prefer
an alternate means of resolving the issue-even if it yields a less attractive
substantive payoff.41 A final possible explanation for parties disengaging from
a mediation following a pessimistic prediction signal is that the parties may
believe that they would not be well-served by a mediator who views the endeavor
41 Examples could include things like divorce, where the parties may find it so hard to
deal with each other that they would prefer to "just get it done." Another example could be
one in which there is an ongoing relationship-one that holds a perception that disputing
would hurt the value of the relationship beyond the value of the dispute itself.
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at hand as unlikely to be successfully completed. The parties may believe that the
mediator suffers from judgment bias of some sort about the likelihood of
settlement, and the parties would rather walk away than choose to deal with that
bias.42 In any event, a party who receives a pessimistic prediction signal might
reasonably opt to withdraw from a mediation in which he would otherwise have
stayed involved.43
While many mediators may view non-settlement of a mediation as a
"failure," predicting and inducing the cessation of negotiations can create value
for the parties involved. In some contexts, a valuable function a mediator can
play may be to act as a screening agent for the parties, assessing the
appropriateness of mediation to the particulars of the dispute. If a pessimistic
prediction signal exerts influence over the parties' behavior, causing them to
cease the mediation more quickly than they might otherwise have done, the
mediator's actions may be largely value-creating. This assumes, of course, that
the influential signal merely acted to hasten an inevitable non-settlement
outcome. It would be an entirely different outcome if the mediator's influential
pessimistic prediction signal acted to cause non-settlement in a case that
otherwise would have settled. Furthermore, this assumes that the parties would
not benefit from engaging in mediation even in the absence of settlement. Many
mediation scholars have suggested that through mediation, parties are better able
to narrow the dispute in question, improve communication, and potentially
protect ongoing relationships-even if the mediation does not produce a
settlement on all of the relevant issues in dispute.44
42 It may be that the parties would prefer to engage the services of a mediator who
believes (even naively) that the mediation process is likely to be of benefit to the parties.
43 If a signal is influential (rather than inconsequential), a mediator's signal may raise
ethical issues, influential signals are unlike the Las Vegas bet that has no effect on the
performance of those on whom the wager is placed (the inconsequential signal). This Article
treats some of these ethical concerns in a later section. For now, consider the degree to which
an influential pessimistic prediction signal would be like a manager or coach betting against
her own team.
44 ROGER & SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAw (1987) quoted
in GOLDBERG ET AL., DisPUTE REsOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER
PRocEssEs 104-131 (2d ed. 1991) ('When the parties fail to agree on all issues, the mediator
may try to salvage the positive results of mediation. The parties may be able to stipulate
certain facts, cooperate in discovery or agree to another way to resolve the dispute. They may
have learned to negotiate better and may, in fact, settle unresolved issues themselves later.')
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C. Predicting Non-Settlement in a Case That Settles
"We had been working at this case for a long time, and I didn't see any
progress at all. The parties were still stuck in their original positions, and I told
them I saw little hope of arriving at a settlement. To my amazement, they almost
immediately began to cooperate with each other, and we ultimately reached an
agreement."
The third story of mediator prediction is one in which the mediator
formulates a pessimistic prediction and signals it, but the parties ultimately settle
the dispute. In short, the mediator's prediction is wrong, or becomes wrong
because the parties change their behavior.
1. Inconsequential Signal
Figure 11. Story Three - Inconsequential Signal
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One reasonable explanation for the disconnect between the predicted
outcome and the actual outcome is that the mediator could simply have been
mistaken in her assessment. As noted above, prediction can be a tremendously
tricky endeavor, and no mediator would ever have access to all of the
information she might desire. If the parties in the dispute did not make the same
miscalculation as the mediator, then they might reasonably opt to ignore the
pessimistic prediction signal as inconsistent with their own perception.
Particularly in complex cases, where parties have reason to distrust the accuracy
or completeness of the mediator's information, it may be reasonable for the
parties to proceed without regard to the mediator's prediction.
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2. Influential Signal
Figure 12. Story Three - Influential Signal
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It is also possible that by sending a pessimistic prediction signal, the
mediator may actually induce behavior that makes her own prediction unlikely.
That is, by telling the parties that she does not think they will settle, the mediator
may be making it more likely that they will. This may happen for a number of
reasons.
One possible explanation for this result is that the parties may experience the
mediator's pessimistic prediction as a challenge against the parties' capacities in
some way. In brief, some groups (even those who previously viewed themselves
as in conflict with each other) may rise to the occasion if they are told that they
do not appear capable of performing a particular task.45 While some parties may
experience a pessimistic prediction as conclusive evidence that they cannot
resolve the issue at hand, others may be motivated by the mediator's prediction
to "prove" their own capabilities by disproving the mediator's stated hypothesis
about the parties' inability to settle.
Another possible explanation for why a pessimistic prediction signal might
induce a settlement-conducive change in the parties' behavior is the way in
which it may change parties' perceptions of their role relative to the mediator. In
some circumstances, parties appear to abdicate all responsibility they may have
for arriving at a settlement, perceiving such activity as "the mediator's job."
Essentially, they engage purely in value-claiming ways, believing that the
45 Bruce Patton introduced me to the idea of "challenges" to groups in June of 1992.
In a classic formulation, the "challenge" method he suggests takes the form of "I wonder if
we are simply incapable of doing X." The observed response is often that groups will be so
uncomfortable with the idea that they are "incapable" of a particular thing that they will
change their behaviors in order to achieve X. Patton, supra note 36.
[Vol. 16:1 2000]
AN EXPLORATION OF MEDIATORS' PREDICTIONS
mediator will figure out a way to create a settlement. If a mediator signals that
she believes that no settlement can be found, it is possible that parties will
believe that they will need to take some responsibility for fixing this mess
themselves (since the mediator seems incapable of doing it herself).46
Finally, it is possible that parties will hear a mediator's pessimistic
prediction signal as a sign that the ZOPA is small enough that continued value-
claiming tactics will not produce a settlement. In essence, the parties may hear
the mediator telling the parties, "You have grabbed more than enough-in fact,
you've grabbed too much." If the parties find the mediator's prediction credible,
they may judge that it is in their interest to change behaviors in a way that makes
settlement more likely.
D. Predicting Settlement in a Case That Does Not Settle
"Everything seemed like it would work The parties were making good
progress, and they seemed like they understood the need for further compromise.
I commented that I thought things were right on track for a settlement, and
suddenly, everything collapsed. We never did get the talks back on track, and
they never did settle."
The fourth and final story involves a case in which the mediator arrives at
the conclusion that a case is destined to settle and indicates that conclusion to the
parties. In the end, however, the case does not reach a settlement. The mediator's
prediction turns out to have been' incorrect or to have caused a change in
behavior she did not anticipate.
46 A variant on this approach sometimes results from intentional actions by mediators
who portray themselves as "dumb mediators" for purposes of causing the disputants to
believe that they must work harder collectively to overcome the ignorance of the mediator.
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1. Inconsequential Signal
Figure 13. Story Four - Inconsequential Signal
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As always, one possibility for explaining this combination of circumstances
stems from mediator error. She may have misunderstood the parties' interests or
reservation values in a critical way. She may have overestimated the amount of
value the parties could collectively generate, or the difficulties that would be
posed by its division. She may have failed to appreciate important non-economic
or even non-rational influences that served as barriers to resolution. For one
reason or another, the mediator may have missed the signs that this case was not
destined to settle.
If the case was not destined to settle, regardless of the efforts of the
mediator, her optimistic prediction signal would have no effect. When acting
outside the realm of theory, where purely rational actors and full information are
assumed, a mediator may develop a belief that a case will settle, despite the
apparent lack of a ZOPA. She may be focusing on the possibility of joint gains,
on the communication or relationship between the parties, or on the likelihood
that subsequent developments or information would arise to cause a change in
the parties' behaviors. Sometimes, her assessment of the likelihood of settlement
will be correct, and a ZOPA will emerge. In other cases, she may formulate and
signal an optimistic prediction in a case that, in fact, will not settle under any
circumstances. Such a signal may lead to surprise or even interest in the parties.
It would not, however, cause them to settle for an amount inferior to their
reservation values. In such cases, no settlement would accrue-whether the
mediator signaled an optimistic prediction or not.
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2. Influential Signal
Figure 14. Story Four - Influential Signal
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Parties may not always ignore a mediator's optimistic signal. It is possible
that parties will make meaning of the optimistic signal and change their behavior
based on that meaning. One potential outcome from that change in behavior is
that parties will act in ways consistent with settlement as a result of the
mediator's signal.47 An alternative story is one in which the parties change their
behaviors away from those conducive to settlement. This is the influential
component of Story Four.
Many mediators signal optimistic predictions with great frequency.48 It is not
uncommon to hear mediators "encouraging" parties by citing the progress they
have made and pointing to the prospect of settlement. Indeed, the optimism
expressed exceeds the optimism apparently merited in many cases. This overly
optimistic tendency may be inconsequential, and therefore without significant
benefit or cost.
If, on the other hand, the behavior is influential, then heightened optimism
(coupled with signaling) may have potential benefits or costs. The potential
benefits of expressing optimism, even in a case that appears not to merit such
optimism, are illustrated with the influential branch of Story One-the one in
which a mediator's optimistic prediction helped to bring about the settlement
itself. The potential costs associated with the expression of unwarranted
optimism appear in this section, the influential branch of Story Four.
47 See supra Part Im.A.2.
48 My observation, and the observation of several of the other experienced mediators
I interviewed, is that this tendency is wide-spread and depends only slightly on the context
in which the mediations take place.
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One of the keys to guessing the impacts of an influential prediction signal
must hinge around the message the parties hear in the signal. For example, in
Story One, the parties may be motivated to continue a particular set of behavior
if they hear the prediction signal to mean, "Keep on doing what you've been
doing." This is consistent with the intention of the mediator in sharing her
optimistic prediction-to cause the continuation of the dynamic she has judged
to be conducive to settlement. In Story Four, it is possible that the parties may
construe a different meaning of an optimistic prediction signal.
One message a party might reasonably hear a mediator sending with her
optimistic prediction is, "You have sacrificed enough." Particularly in cases that
have significant and easily quantified distributive issues, it is common for parties
to have partisan perceptions about how much they have contributed or sacrificed
as compared with the other side. In this context, each part believes that he has
sacrificed more and that the remaining burden should be shouldered by the other
side.49 Thus, a mediator's optimistic prediction signal might be interpreted as an
invitation to "sit back." If both parties interpret the optimistic signal this way,
and they are not already at a point within the ZOPA, they may both change their
behavior in ways that make settlement less likely. In the words of one
international negotiation practitioner, the parties' "manage to snatch defeat from
the jaws of victory"50 by believing that they have no further responsibility to see
the negotiations conclude.
A second message a party might receive from a mediator's optimistic
prediction signal is, "The ZOPA here is large. You can claim more." Uncertain
whether there is a ZOPA at all, parties might reasonably decide to begin
negotiations with a conciliatory, pro-settlement approach. Particularly in contexts
where each perceives his BATNA to be very unattractive, the parties may see the
risks of early "value-claiming" tactics as too significant. On the other hand, if
such parties then received a signal from the mediator that she was confident that
a settlement would be found, each party might perceive the signal almost as an
invitation to claim more, rather than as a statement of the need to continue his
earlier productive behavior. As one economist and negotiation scholar put it, "I'd
think I didn't grab enough if you told me you thought we were going to settle." 51
49 THOMPSON, supra note 23, at 32-35; Linda Babcock, Biased Judgments of Fairness
in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 1337 (1995); David M. Messick & Keith Sentis,
Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Biases, in EQurry THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61, 61-94 (David M. Messick & Karen S. Cook eds., 1983).
50 Interview with Joe Stanford, Senior Consultant, Conflict Management Group, in
Port-au-Prince, Haiti (Oct. 21, 1998).
51 Interview with David Metcalfe, CEO, vitivio.com, in Cambridge, Mass., (Dec. 3,
1999).
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Parties may change their behavior in ways that make settlement less likely
if they receive an Optimistic prediction signal. They may become more passive,
each waiting for the other side, or perhaps the mediator, to finish the job. They
may even decide to adopt a wholly different set of behaviors, engaging in
claiming tactics in ways they had not previously.
IV. A DiRTY Lx=TE SECRET? UNTRUTFUL PREDICTION SIGNALS
In each of the four stories above, the mediator is described as developing her
prediction based on her observations and signaling that prediction to the parties.
An assumption underlying each of these four stories is that the prediction the
mediator formulates matches the prediction she signals. In other words, each of
these stories assumes that the mediator does not misrepresent her prediction to
the parties. It seems unlikely that this assumption is universally appropriate in the
world of practice.
Why would a mediator misrepresent her prediction in signaling it to the
parties? Listed below are four possible motivations for a mediator to intentionally
send a prediction signal which is opposite of the one she actually holds.52 The
first three explanations are not particularly charitable to mediators, and they
likely account for, at most, a small fraction of the cases in which mediators signal
predictions they do not believe. The final explanation, however, illustrates an
important point about the dynamic nature of prediction signaling and mediation
outcomes.
A. Sending False Signals to Avoid Discomfort
The first uncharitable explanation for willful misrepresentation by the
mediator could be a simple aversion to delivering unwelcome news. If a mediator
believes that a case is unlikely to settle and knows that both parties dislike their
non-settlement alternatives, she may be hesitant to deliver her pessimistic
prediction accurately. A mediator might do this if she believed that the signal
would be inconsequential. "As long as the signal is inconsequential," she might
reason, "the parties are no worse off for my having signaled an optimistic
prediction. They still would have failed to settle, and I would not have to go
52 There are a great number of reasons why a mediator's prediction may be wrong. Her
information may be incomplete; the parties may change behaviors; external factors may
arise; or her analysis may be imperfect. Mediators are only human, after all, and it is not
surprising to think that their predictions may sometimes be wrong. On the other hand, this
section explores the possibility that a mediator's prediction signal may be inaccurate or false.
If, for example, a mediator formulates and holds an Optimistic prediction but signals a
Pessimistic prediction, her prediction signal is inaccurate.
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through the unpleasant experience of telling them I thought they wouldn't settle."
This explanation runs counter to most visions of professionalism. Without
entering the debate over whether mediation qualifies as a profession, most would
agree that it would be inappropriate for a mediator, or anyone hired to perform
a service, to sacrifice her clients' interests in having full information, in favor of
her own interest in relative social comfort. Building inspectors, doctors, lawyers,
and management consultants regularly encounter information they know their
clients would consider "bad news." Even if the delivery of that news may be
inconsequential, it would be difficult to defend a decision to deliver the opposite
news to the client.
B. Sending False Signals for Personal Gain
A second, even more unflattering explanation for a misrepresentation by a
mediator, would be one in which the mediator would stand to gain from the
continuation or cessation of the mediation. Imagine a case in which a mediator
charged the parties a daily rate and quickly came to the conclusion that the case
was destined not to settle. By sending an optimistic prediction signal, the
mediator could seek to extend the mediation (and her paychecks). If the parties
are influenced by the signal, they would remain engaged in an effort the mediator
believed was doomed to fail. Similarly, it is not impossible to imagine a scenario
in which a mediator would stand to gain if a mediation session ended quickly,
even if there were no settlement. For example, a mediator might be engaged by
two relatively small corporations locked in a bitter, but low-stakes contract
dispute. Imagine that this mediator received an offer to mediate a far larger, more
lucrative mediation elsewhere on condition that she begin tomorrow. The
mediator in that case might have an incentive to signal a pessimistic prediction
to the parties, in the hopes that it would be influential, quickly creating an
outcome like the one in Story Two.
It is important to note at this point that both of these explanations may
accurately capture the practices of some mediators, but they are not intended to
be prescriptive or suggestive of good practices. Both contain serious breaches of
a mediator's ethical responsibilities to her parties and clients. It is not within the
scope of this Article to consider the full range of ethical implications associated
with prediction or prediction signaling. Surely, though, there would be few who
would suggest that it is appropriate for a mediator to make misrepresentations to
the parties in order to advance her own personal interests at the expense of the
parties' interests.
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C. Sending False Signals "Because It's My Job to Be Optimistic"
A third possible explanation for a mediator's decision to misrepresent her
prediction signal to the parties deals specifically with falsely optimistic
predictions. Some mediators appear to signal forms of optimistic predictions in
virtually every case they mediate.53 The statistics on settlement rates in
mediations vary considerably, and in many cases they are quite high.54 Still, the
percentages would suggest that at least sometimes every mediator will be faced
with a case that is destined not to settle. Indeed, a mediator who settles 100% of
her cases merits considerable scrutiny for evidence of coercion or other
inappropriate behavior. Some cases should not settle, and many will not settle.
Given this, the fact that some mediators seem to send optimistic prediction
signals in every case suggests that the signals themselves may not be genuine
reflections of the mediator's assessment of the likelihood of settlement.55
The mediators in these cases may have a narrow assumption about the
appropriate role(s) of mediators. Among the roles that they consider appropriate
is that of "cheerleader"-the person encouraging the parties along, often by
signaling optimistic predictions. This could be because they are trained to do so-
sending optimistic signals regardless of the context. They may also do so because
optimistic prediction signals appear to be more consistent with the cheerleader
function than a pessimistic prediction signal would be. Imagine the cheerleading
squad on the side of the field chanting, "We don't think you're going to win, but
go team anyway!" That hardly rolls off the tongue like, 'We're number one! Go
5 3 These statements may be as straight-forward as saying, "I think we'll be able to find
a settlement you'll both like." Alternatively, they may be less directly predictive. Many
mediators, for example, frequently declare to the parties that "We've made great progress
so far," even in cases where such progress is not immediately apparent. Furthermore, they
appear to allow the perception that this progress is significant enough to warrant optimism.
54 See Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the
Mediation of Social Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PRocass AND EFFECTIVENESS
OFTHiRD-PARTY INTERVENTION 394, 397 (Kenneth Kressel et al. eds., 1989) (claiming that
a median rate of settlement can be estimated to be around 60%); Jeanne M. Brett et al., The
Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major
Service Providers, 12 NEGOTIATION J. 259, 259 (1996) (showing a study of four major
service providers had settlement rates of around 78%).
55 It is possible that a mediator might be stricken with such an o ,erpowering case of
optimistic overconfidence in her own abilities that she would be unable to conduct a
reasonable assessment of the likelihood of settlement. That is, a mediator might believe in
her own abilities so strongly that she would never meet a case she did not believe she could
settle. Such a condition strikes me as dangerous in several ways. Importantly, though, such
cases do not fall within this analysis because those particular mediators, in fact, believe their
optimistic prediction signal, even though most outside observers would not. This section
focuses on those who do not believe the signal they are sending.
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team!" In essence, a mediator may misrepresent a pessimistic prediction signal
because it feels wrong to signal something inconsistent with settlement.
This rationale for misrepresenting a prediction signal may be descriptively
accurate, but it is not easily defensible. It relies on an assumption about the role
of the mediator that is unjustified by the increasingly sophisticated market for
mediation services. Parties may hire a mediator for any number of reasons-for
their assistance in facilitating communication, for their creativity, for their
expertise in a subject matter, for their skill in coordinating complex processes,
for their ability to attract resources or attention to the dispute, and for a number
of other reasons. Parties may also hire a mediator purely for her ability to play a
cheerleading function. Absent specific evidence that this is the case, however,
it is inappropriate for a mediator to assume that this is the only, or even the most
important, function she can provide to the parties or that this function should
trump other possible functions potentially impacted by candid disclosure.
D. Sending False Signals Hoping They Will Be Influential
The most likely, and most charitable, reason for a mediator to misrepresent
a prediction is that she may believe that the prediction signal would be
influential, leading to settlement. Assume that the mediator believes that the
parties would like to arrive at a settlement and that it is her job to do what she
can in order to help them do so. If a mediator in that case held a pessimistic
prediction, she might opt to send an Optimistic prediction signal, in the hopes
that it would be influential and lead to an outcome like that described in Story
One. The optimistic prediction signal might become a self-fulfilling prophesy,
creating the outcome the parties desired. Similarly, imagine a case in which a
mediator formulated an optimistic prediction. She might signal that prediction,
in the hopes that Story One would result. She may also have reason to fear that
the parties would react badly to receiving an optimistic prediction signal. In that
case, she might choose to signal a pessimistic prediction, in the hopes that it
would spur action in the parties, leading to settlement as in Story Three. The
misrepresentations in these cases are motivated by an assumption that settlement
is the desired outcome and by an assumption that the mediator's prediction signal
will be influential.
E. The Implications of False Signaling
The practice of signaling a prediction one does not actually hold raises very
serious ethical questions for practicing mediators. The question of mediators'
duties to the parties is not one on which there is consensus within the mediation
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community.56 It is also not within the scope of this Article to consider fully the
ethical ramifications of mediator misrepresentations. Still, it is important for
practitioners to note that the end of settlement may not serve as an adequate
justification for the misrepresentations described in the sectionsabove.
At a more practical level, it is important to note that if it is possible that a
mediator may misrepresent her prediction signal to the 'parties, then it is
appropriate to assume that the parties recognize this possibility as well. Parties
will always have to assess the likelihood that a mediator's prediction is
inaccurate because of incomplete information. With the introduction of the
possibility of misrepresentation, parties must also assess the likelihood that the
mediator's prediction signal is genuine before determining whether to allow the
prediction to affect their behavior in any way. The result of this possibility is that
it appears less likely that a mediator's prediction signal will be influential,
because parties may have discounted its accuracy.
V. IN PRACTICE
The primary focus of this Article has been to introduce the concept of
mediator prediction. Mediators often engage in prediction formulation, and many
engage in signaling. It seems, however, that this practice has been largely
unconscious, or at least without any particular organizing theoretical foundation.
The impacts of prediction signaling are difficult to foresee, at best. The
sections above suggest several reasons for this difficulty, and there are likely
many other factors that contribute to make any exploration of mediation
prediction dynamics a difficult one to understand fully. Without ignoring those
difficulties, there are many avenues of inquiry, not yet explored, that may shed
light on the practice of mediator prediction formulation and signaling.57
56 The various draft versions of the Uniform Mediation Act provide some illustration
of the debate over mediators' duties and potential liability or immunity. See generally
Bridget Genteman Hoy, Comment, The Draft Uniform Mediation Act In Context: Can It
Clear Up The Clutter?, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1121 (2000). For more on immunity, see
generally Arthur A. Chaykin, The Liabilities and Immunities of Mediators: A Hostile
Environment for Model Legislation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 47 (1986); Arthur
Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 731
(1984).
57 Specifically, I believe that there are at least three different potentially useful lines of
inquiry regarding mediator predictions. First, there are important descriptive questions about
what mediators' actual practices are in formulating and signaling prediction. Second, there
are some interesting analytic questions regarding the incentive structures created by the
addition of this information into disputants' calculations in various conditions. Finally, there
are several fundamental ethical questions about mediation and the role of the mediator
illustrated by the concept of prediction, although certainly not limited to prediction.
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Nevertheless, mediators who formulate and signal predictions can provide
appropriate and helpful services to their clients in the context of a mediation.
Prediction formulation is not the sole function of a mediator, nor should
mediators signal all of their predictions all of the time. Instead, mediators should
consider the potential merits of prediction formulation and signaling in particular
contexts and in particular ways. The sections below are designed to highlight
some of the considerations and practices mediators might adopt in their treatment
of predictions.
A. Dampened Certainty
A mediator's information is virtually never complete. She may have
confidence that she has gathered most of the relevant information, and she may
have a high degree of confidence that the information she has gathered is
accurate. Still, it would be troublesome if a mediator required fall and complete
information before engaging in a particular behavior.58 Such a constraint would
effectively lead to inaction by a conscientious mediator because she would
recognize that she never had complete information.
Information asymmetries and imperfect information are a fact of bargaining
in virtually all contexts. At times, the information asymmetry or imperfection is
a function of benign, or at least, unintentional factors. In many other cases, the
reality of mediation practice involves mediators receiving partial disclosures,
"puffery," and even outright lying from the parties. Until this point, this Article
has assumed that disclosure between each party and the mediator has been full
and truthful. 59 This assumption is an ideal rarely, if ever, realized in practice for
a variety of reasons.
Sometimes, parties will not convey whole or wholly accurate information to
the mediator. Parties are human, and almost always suffer from the same
perception problems that plague the rest of us. They are incapable of processing
all of the information available to them, instead selecting and considering only
a portion of what is really happening. Parties tend to perceive data according to
biases they hold, filtering out disconfirming data and highlighting data that
58 This would be as true for prediction as it would be for many other mediation
practices. For example, mediators frame issues, some generate options, and some pronounce
evaluations-all without the benefit of truly complete and accurate information.
59 1 have not considered the possible information asymmetries that take place when the
communication is not open. For example, if a mediator reveals her prediction to the parties
in a setting other than ajoint-session, the knowledge that the mediator's prediction is X will
not be common knowledge. That is, F will not know whether the mediator said the same
thing to A.
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confirm their previously held beliefs.60 Even if parties had perceived everything,
they would be hard pressed to convey it in any meaningful way to the mediator
and the other party. Timing and communication constraints necessarily prevent
completely full disclosure, even when that is the speaker's intent. Furthermore,
parties may, with the best of intentions, try to explain only those things they
believe to be relevant, missing opportunities to fully explore an issue. Therefore,
even when there are no reasons to believe that one or both parties intend not to
reveal his perspective fully, a mediator should recognize that the information
available is almost certainly incomplete, if not inaccurate.
Further complicating these considerations is the fact that parties also often
engage in calculated, strategic behavior designed to create conditions of
imperfect or incomplete information. A party may try to mislead the mediator or
the other party about his actual reservation value, or about any number of other
factors relevant to the dispute in question.61 There is debate among observers of
negotiation regarding the effectiveness of lying.62 From a descriptive perspective,
however, few would contend that parties do not sometimes perceive a benefit
from misrepresentation. It is not surprising, therefore, that parties sometimes do
not communicate entirely truthfully within the context of a mediation.
Mediation parties do not always tell the truth, and they certainly do not
always tell "the whole truth." Parties to mediations generally take no oath
regarding the veracity of their statements, and there is no risk of perjury charges
6 0 RIcHARD NISBErT & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS
OF SoCIAL JUDGMENT 7-8 (1980); Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday
Life: Implications for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE
103, 117-18 (Edward S. Brown et al. eds., 1996).
61 Gerald Wetlaufer has suggested:
[A negotiator] might lie about the nature, history, characteristics, or value of the
property which is the subject of the negotiation .... [A negotiator might also make]
false promises, false threats, and false predictions related to the value of the property
which is the subject of the negotiation. [And a negotiator might] lie about [their]
client's opinions, characteristics, authority, interests and priorities, reservation price,
or alternatives to agreement.
Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 IOWA L. REv. 1219, 1224-25
(1990); see also Lax & Sebenius, supra note 7, at 139-41 (describing typical categories of
things about which parties mislead in negotiations).
6 2 Compare ROBERTH. TRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: T1 STRATEGIc ROLE OF THE
EMOTIONs 165 (1988) (asserting "the art of bargaining" is "in large part the art of' sending
misleading messages about reservation values), and James White, Machiavelli and the Bar:
Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOuND. RES. J. 926, 928 ("[The
critical difference between those who are successful negotiators and those who are not lies
in this capacity both to mislead and not to be misled."), with SIssELA BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PuBUc AND PRIVATE LIFE 47-56 (1978) (suggesting that there is a fairly uniform
tendency to underestimate the reputational, societal, and personal costs of lying).
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linked to assertions made during a typical mediation. 63 As a result, the legal
safeguards regarding the honesty of parties stem either from the professional
codes of ethics that govern certain kinds of parties (like attorneys) or from the
law of fraud.
For lawyers participating in a mediation process, state codes or rules of
professional responsibility bar attorneys from making some misrepresentations
on behalf of their clients.64 However, there is a large category of information
about which attorneys have no particular duty to disclose truthfully. For example,
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility Rule 4.1 specifically provides in its
comment that attorneys have no obligation to be truthful in discussing
"[e]stimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction [or] a party's
intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim."65 Lawyers' statements
regarding reservation values, therefore, are not constrained by lawyers'
professional ethics. 66 There are also contexts in which attorneys' duties to their
clients will prohibit them from truthfully disclosing certain information. For
example, a client may bar an attorney from revealing certain kinds of
information, and an attorney cannot ethically break that confidence unless the
nature of the information disclosed falls within a very narrow set of exceptions. 67
Under the current system of regulating attorneys' behavior, therefore, there is
63 Some proceedings before neutrals contain more heightened protections against
misrepresentations. Statements before a judicial tribunal or officer, for example, may expose
the speaker to criminal charges of perjury if it is later learned that he "[w]illfully subscribes
as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true." 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2)
(1994).
64 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSImY DR 7-102 (1998); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 (1998).
65 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CO-DUcT R. 4.1 cmt. (1998).
66 It is important to note, however, that while an attorney has no duty to be truthful in
statements regarding a reservation value, the law of fraud may serve as a bar on
misrepresentations regarding the alleged "facts" that underlie the formation of that assertion.
For example, a Massachusetts court held that it was fraud for a landlord to assert that his
reservation value was increasing rent by $10,000 because he had a prospective tenant ready
and willing to pay that rent and would evict the current tenant immediately unless that tenant
agreed to a similar increase. See generally Kabatchnick v. Hanover-Elm Building Corp. 103
N.E.2d 692 (Mass. 1952).
67 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1998); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBiLTrrY DR 4-101 (1999).
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only a partial effort to guarantee the veracity of statements made in the course of
a mediation.68
The law of fraud applies to all parties engaged in bargaining, without regard
to their professional affiliations. Like the professional responsibility provisions,
however, it provides only partial guarantees regarding the veracity or
completeness of statements from the parties. Succinctly, the common law of
fraud holds that a negotiator may not make a knowing misrepresentation of a
"material" fact on which the listener reasonably relies and which causes
damage. 69 There have been few actions brought under the law of fraud with
respect to agreements reached during mediations. 70 It is useful to note that the
law of fraud provides very little protection with respect to the veracity of
statements regarding many of the kinds of information this Article has
considered. For example, reservation values are not considered to be "material"
facts, making the law of fraud inapplicable.71 Indeed, the notion of "puffery" is
68 Recognizing this, Kimberlee Kovach has proposed a "good faith" requirement on
both parties and counsel engaged in mediation. Her proposed addition to the Model Rules
would hold, "During the mediation, the lawyer shall not convey information that is
intentionally misleading or false to the mediator or other participants." Kimberlee Kovach,
Good Faith in Mediation-Requested, Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S.
TIxAs L. REV. 575, 622 (1997). Furthermore, she would provide a statutory basis for "good
faith," one part of which would be defined as "making no affirmative misrepresentations or
misleading statements to other parties or the mediator during the mediation." Id at 623. This
Article does not intend to treat the merits of her proposal, but it is important to note that no
such requirements currently constrain parties or their counsel during the course of
mediations.
69 G. Richard Shell, When Is It Legal to Lie in Negotiations?, 32 SLOAN MGT. REv. 93,
94-95 (1991); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS 728-29 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that scienter or an intention to induce action by means
of the misrepresentation may be an additional element).
70 Confidentiality provisions generally protect parties and mediators from having their
mediation statements or actions examined by those not present in the mediation. Recognizing
that this could promote fraud, most mediation confidentiality provisions now allow parties
to disclose assertions or representations made during the course of a mediation in the course
of an action alleging fraud on behalf of one of the parties. E.g., UNIFORMvI MEDIATION ACT
§ 8(b)(2) (Reporter's Interim Draft Mar. 2000). Section 8(b)(2) allows an exception to
confidentiality when:
[The evidence is offered in a proceeding in which fraud, duress, or incapacity is in
issue regarding the validity or enforceability of an agreement evidenced by a record and
reached by the disputants as the result of a mediation, but only regarding evidence
provided by persons other than the mediator of the dispute at issue.
Id.
71 For an outstanding and concise treatment of the application of the law of fraud to
negotiation dynamics, see generally Shell, supra note 65.
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treated as an acceptable and expected part of the bargaining process by the legal
constraints on bargainers. 72 Therefore, while the prospect of an action under the
common law of fraud may serve to prevent certain misrepresentations, it does not
serve as any kind of guarantee that the parties will engage in fully open and
truthful exchanges.
The fact that there are not specific legal guarantees of full and complete
disclosure does not mean that mediation parties are necessarily engaged in
misrepresentation and willful nondisclosure at every juncture. Many parties and
counsel will decide to disclose with a greater degree of candor than the codes of
ethics mandate. Some may even disclose more than is in their strategic interest.
In some cases, mediators endeavor to secure non-binding undertakings from the
mediation participants so that they will operate "in good faith. '73 Nevertheless,
it is important to note that participants' statements or disclosures in a mediation
are at least suspect.
Therefore, a mediator can never be fully confident that she has full,
complete, and accurate information about all of the circumstances relevant to a
dispute. The parties may not have perceived everything that was relevant
originally. The parties may not recognize what is relevant and what is
unimportant. The parties may have unintentionally communicated information
imperfectly. They may also have endeavored to mislead the mediator or the other
party about one or more aspects of the circumstances surrounding the dispute.
Rather than permit this recognizable imperfection in information to lead to
inaction, practicing mediators should recognize that their lack of complete
information merely leads to dampened certainty. A mediator attempting to set out
an agenda that includes the necessary issues to be resolved in a dispute would be
best served to make her proposed agenda tentative, allowing the parties to fill in
where the mediator's information may have been incomplete. 74 A mediator
formulating an evaluation of the likely non-settlement outcome may hedge her
evaluation with a statement regarding some of the uncertainties surrounding any
such endeavor. A mediator who believes she may have discovered a settlement
option that would be attractive to both parties would necessarily check with the
parties because she may have misunderstood their interests in a way that would
prevent her from accurately gauging the parties' assessments of the option.
72 For a discussion of the statutory authority for and limits on the scope of "puffery,"
see generally Scott S. Dahl, Ethics on the Table: Stretching the Truth in Negotiations, 8 REv.
OFLITIG. 173, 178-84 (1989); Gerald B. Wetlaufer. The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 76
IowAL. REv. 1219, 1244-45 (1990).
73 See Kovach, supra note 64, at 596-99.
74 For a description of some of the variables that inform agenda creation and framing,
see generally CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 213-30 (2d ed. 1996).
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With regard to prediction, the same dampened certainty is sensible. A
mediator's prediction is a function of probabilistic projections based on partial
information. In almost all circumstances, a mediator would be unable to form a
prediction with complete certainty. In practical terms, this translates into
statements with qualifiers (e.g., "very likely to settle"- or "unlikely to settle")
rather than pronouncements of fact (e.g., "will settle" or "will not settle").
B. Timing Prediction Formulation and Signaling
When should predictions and prediction signaling take place? Intuitively,
there seems to be a significant difference between a mediator making a predictive
pronouncement within the first few moments of a mediation and one who
forwards a prediction after she and the parties have engaged in considerable
effort. Much of this difference stems from the fact that the passage of time in the
mediation serves as something of a proxy for information. That is, as time passes,
a mediator has a better sense of what information is important, can assess the
accuracy of the information she has collected, has time to collect more
information, and recognizes the information that is unavailable to her. Similarly,
the parties have an increasingly good sense of how the information flows to the
mediator and can, therefore, attach greater credibility to the mediator's prediction
signal.75
These factors would suggest that mediators should not formulate or signal
predictions until late in a mediation, when information is more complete. This
practice would, at a minimum, serve to increase the accuracy of the predictions
a mediator formulates. Those who make guesses about the likelihood of
settlement toward the outset of the endeavor would almost certainly err more
often than those who waited until they had fuller information. There may be
credibility implications to premature predictions that will push mediators to want
to predict later.
Accuracy in predictions is not necessarily the consideration that should drive
mediators, however, and there may be very good reasons for a mediator to
75 These concerns about information accuracy form part of the rationale for Marjorie
Corman Aaron's suggestion that mediators who engage in evaluation should do so only as
a "last" measure. Marjorie Corman Aaron, A Mediator's Soliloquy, 14 ALTERNATwVES TO THE
HIGH COST OFLILG. 63, 63 (1996).
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formulate and signal predictions much earlier in a mediation. 76 Each mediator
will surely have her own personal sense of the degree of confidence she would
want to have before making any predictive signal. Most, however, will view the
potential utility of formulating and signaling predictions as a function of far more
than just the accuracy of the prediction. 77 The potential benefits of an influential
prediction signal suggest that mediators should look to formulate predictions
early and often in a mediation. By formulating them early, the mediator preserves
the possibility of choosing to signal a prediction that is ultimately influential. By
formulating them often, a mediator accounts not only for the imperfection of
information noted in the section above, but also for the dynamic nature of the
influences on parties in a mediation.
C. Prediction Plus: The Merits of "If... Then" Statements
Until now, this Article has considered predictions in a way that separates
prediction from the rest of a mediator's practice. The predictions discussed to
this point have followed a simple formula: "I do (or do not) think this case is
likely to settle." This analysis has treated the statement as wholly separate from
all other things a mediator might do or say in connection with a statement to the
parties. In a sense, these "naked" predictions have been treated as the only thing
a mediator might do over the course of a mediation. A reader unfamiliar with the
wide range of mediation practices might wrongly believe that this Article is
suggesting that mediation is all about predicting settlement or non-settlement.
The practice of mediation has many different aspects, and mediators are often
called upon to do and say a wide range of different things over the course of a
mediation. Mediators often isolate or frame issues, help to craft potential
settlement options, aid the parties in engaging in productive dialogue by asking
carefully crafted questions, and a whole host of other non-prediction activities
that this Article has not considered. This Article has treated predictions as largely
76 Among the topics not considered in this Article is the question of impetus for
prediction signaling. A mediator might, for example, choose to signal her prediction on her
own initiative. In many respects, that is the paradigmatic signal considered in this Article.
"I've been thinking about this case, and I think .... At the same time, she may receive a
question from a party that prompts a predictive response. It is not uncommon for parties to
turn to a mediator and inquire about the mediator's sense of the utility of continuing the
mediation process. "Before we go forward with any of this, I have to ask, do you think this
is worth it? Are we getting anywhere?" The response to such an inquiry could easily include
a predictive signal.
77 At the extreme, a mediator could almost certainly achieve a very high "batting
average" or "success rate" if the only variable measured is the accuracy of her predictions.
She could simply wait, predicting non-settlement only after impasse is reached or predicting
settlement only after the parties have picked up the pen to sign the final agreement.
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separate from the rest of these activities, describing them as if they were naked
interventions in which both the mediator and the parties play otherwise passive
roles. To some extent, the predictions sound almost fatalistic---"It will (or it.will
not) settle regardless of what you or I do."
It is difficult to imagine that a mediator would purposively make a statement
so wholly unconnected to the rest of her interactions with the parties, particularly
when these statements risk having negative impacts on the parties' behaviors or
perceptions. Instead, a mediator is most likely to articulate a prediction
recognizing that the prediction is both based on incomplete and potentially
inaccurate information and a function of projection into the future. That is, the
prediction is formed when neither settlement nor terminal impasse has yet
occurred. The prediction is, in part, the mediator's best guess estimate about
settlement likelihood, given what has happened so far.
The formula for prediction signaling most likely to be conducive to this
environment is one that takes the form of an "If... then" statement. There are
at least two significant variables a mediator may include in the formation of her
prediction (also noting the assumptions listed above). First, a mediator considers
a range of information disclosed to her by the parties over the course of the
mediation, which the mediator determines to be relevant to the formation of a
prediction. Second, a mediator observes some of the behavior between the
parties, and her prediction may be a function of those observations. A mediator
could choose to make either or both of these sets of information explicit in the
process of conveying her prediction to the parties. The following sections explore
the potential merits of a mediator being transparent78 about each of these
variables. The basic formula for signaling prediction under this construct, then,
would be as follows: "If [this condition is true or persists] then [my prediction
is X]."
1. If [information is correct] Then... [prediction]
A mediator might choose to share with the parties not only her prediction,
but also the set of information she has gathered in order to form that prediction.
A mediator could choose to be explicit in this way whether she had formulated
an optimistic prediction or a pessimistic prediction.
One possible benefit for mediators of being explicit about the information
set in question is that it may serve to decrease some of the parties' incentives to
78 In an earlier article, I suggested that mediator "transparency"-the practice of a
mediator sharing her thoughts with the parties on a range of topics-may hold particular
advantage for mediators in some contexts. See generally Michael Moffitt, Casting Light on
the Black Box of Mediation: Should Mediators Make Their Conduct More Transparent? 13
OmO ST. J. ON DIsP. RFsOL. 1 (1997).
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engage in strategic misrepresentation. For example, a mediator might say, "If the
reservation values you have each revealed to me privately are accurate, then I am
extremely pessimistic that we will arrive at a settlement in this case."'79 The
mediator could have simply signaled that she was pessimistic that the parties
would be able to find a settlement. The addition of the conditional statement
indicates to the parties the basis for the mediator's prediction. Implicit in this
indication is an invitation to one or both of the parties to "correct" the mediator's
understanding of the relevant information, lest the mediation reach no
settlement.80
In another example, a mediator might say, "If I understand correctly that X
is the only issue left to resolve, then I believe we are very likely to arrive at a
settlement here." The potential benefit of a statement like this one is that it may
serve to focus the parties' efforts on the topic X, identified by the mediator as
being the issue to resolve. The carrot the mediator is offering-settlement-is in
many cases the thing the parties were seeking in entering the mediation in the
first place. On the other hand, a statement like this one risks inviting the parties
to amend the information in question, in this case by telling the mediator that
there are other issues to be resolved beyond X. It also risks creating an incentive
for both parties to dig their heels in on what they now know to be the last issue
on the table.
2. If [behavior continues] Then... [prediction]
A mediator could also choose to be explicit about the behavior she is
observing and share her projection of the implications of continuing that dynamic
between the parties.
For example, a mediator might say to the parties, "If you both continue to
uphold our agreed upon prohibition against public statements or leaks to the
press, I think we should be able to sustain this level of progress and arrive at a
solution." The potential benefit of such a statement would be that the parties
would have an explicit understanding of the behavior the mediator believes will
lead to the predicted outcome. In this case, the parties would understand that the
79 A statement like this may implicate the confidentiality guarantees attached to the
parties' caucuses with the mediator. It is not implausible, however, that a mediator could
have secured permission to use the information in a non-specific way such as this.
80 Under the original assumptions of full, open and truthful exchange, there would be
no need for disclosure of the information set(s) in question. A mediator would have no
reason to believe that the information would (or could) change in any way, so a naked
prediction would suffice. In the real world, in which parties lie or exaggerate in portions of
their statements to mediators, there may need to be a vehicle for mediators to allow parties
to re-open assertions they have made previously.
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mediator believes that continued adherence to a particular gag rule is a key to
arriving at an acceptable settlement.
A mediator might be even more inclined to employ this constructin cases
when she has developed a pessimistic prediction. In that case, the mediator
would be seeking to admonish the parties from continuing the behavior she
identifies. Such statements may focus on very specific behavior. For example,
a mediator may say, "If the two of you continue to interrupt each other and insult
each other personally, I believe it will be impossible for us to arrive at a
settlement." A mediator could also use this formula for addressing structural or
systemic behaviors. For example, a mediator might say, "If you two continue to
refuse to involve the principals in these discussions, I don't think we'll end up
resolving any of the tough issues on the table." In both of these cases, the parties
are given not only the mediator's prediction, but also a specific indication of the
behaviors that would have to change in order for the prediction to change.
D. For What Purpose?
There are some tasks mediators appear to do without thinking about the
ultimate purpose behind the activity. Some mediators appear to have their
introductory statements so finely tuned that the beginning of their mediations are
consistent, regardless of circumstance. Others seem to jump in and out of caucus
merely because they "didn't know what else to do." Such practices are probably
not ideal in any circumstance. When the tasks in question hold little risk of
negative impact on the parties, however, mediators may be able to "get away
with" this less than purposive behavior.
It is not easy to formulate a thoughtful prediction, and it is not easy to figure
out how best to signal a prediction once it is formulated. The complexities
involved and the potential risks associated with prediction signaling suggest
strongly that a mediator should have a particular purpose in mind before
engaging in predictive behavior in the mediation. Given the potential risks and
rewards involved in prediction signaling, the practice of formulating and sharing
predictions is neither a universally helpful move, nor a universally inappropriate
move. In some cases, it may not be helpful at all. In others, it may provide useful
information to the parties at multiple stages of the discussions. It seems wisest
for a mediator to consider predictions and prediction signaling only when she can
formulate for herself a specific rationale-a story about why prediction signaling
would be useful to the parties at that moment.
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VI. OBJECTIONS TO MEDIATOR PREDICTION
Prediction, as defined in this Article, has not been treated by mediation
literature, and it is likely that some within the mediation community will view the
practice of prediction signaling as ill-advised, or worse. The following sections
anticipate a primary set of arguments from critics and suggest at least brief
responses to those objections.
A. Think No Evil: Do Not Even Formulate a Prediction
There are at least two reasons why some within the mediation community
might argue that it is inappropriate for mediators to even formulate predictions,
let alone signal them to the parties. The first of these arguments is utilitarian. The
second stems from a specific vision of the mediation process and its goals.
Prediction formulation and signaling are not costless, and it is no guarantee
of improved results. There are likely to be those within the mediation community
who will consider the merits of prediction formulation and signaling, assess the
potential benefits and costs associated with it, and ultimately judge 'that its
potential payoff cannot warrant the effort it demands or the risks it may create.
They will judge that mediators would better serve the parties by focusing on
other aspects of the mediation, rather than focusing on the question of the
likelihood of settlement. Their vision of "best practice" for mediators, therefore,
would be not to even invest the energy required to formulate a prediction.
This utilitarian objection is well-founded, but overstates the scope of the
objection. There are mediation circumstances in which the parties would not be
served in any particular way by a prediction signal. A prediction signal would,
at most, be inconsequential, and the parties would be best served by having the
mediator focus her efforts elsewhere. At the same time, it seems extremely
unlikely that a mediator could declare ex ante that no parties would ever alter
their behavior or decisions based on a predictive statement from the mediator.
Furthermore, it is at least plausible that a mediator could figure out a way to
frame her prediction signal in a way that minimizes some of the potential risks
outlined in earlier sections. Assuming this is true, there are some circumstances
in which prediction could serve the parties' interests well. At most, therefore, this
utilitarian objection suggests that mediators should not blindly engage in
prediction in all cases, but it does not follow that mediators should never engage
in prediction.
A second set of objections to prediction may arise from those mediation
practitioners and scholars who have developed a particularized vision of what
constitutes "good mediation." Mediation scholars have defined "good" both in
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the negative and in the positive.81 An example of a negative definition of "good
mediation" is found in some of the criticism leveled against the practice of
evaluation within mediation. Often, these criticisms conclude that "good
mediation" practice can include a range of different approaches, as long as none
of them is evaluative.82 For adherents to these definitions of "good mediation"
practice, it is unclear what their response would be to the prospect of mediators
engaging in prediction. Because prediction has not before been discussed, there
is no "negative definition" of "good mediation" that would preclude prediction.
An example of a positive description of "good mediation" may be found in
the "transformative" approach to mediation, suggested by Bush and Folger.
83 It
is a positive description in the sense that Bush and Folger define specifically
what the approach and practices of the mediator should include. It is much easier
to assess the fit between the practice of prediction signaling and the model they
forward because they have offered such a strict list of "appropriate" mediator
activities. In brief, Bush and Folger suggest that mediators should limit their
activities within a mediation to those things that are designed to "empower" and
those things designed to encourage "recognition." It is difficult to imagine
prediction signaling falling within either of these two categories, making it most
likely that adherents to this vision of mediation would object to the practice of
prediction signaling.
In fact, the objection to prediction from proponents of the transformative
model of mediation is likely to extend beyond a mere admonition against
signaling. Instead, they would be most likely to object that the prediction
framework itself runs counter to the underlying principles involved in "good
mediation." Proponents of transformative mediation specifically criticize all
approaches to mediation that hold a problem-solving framework as their
foundation. Instead, Bush and Folger suggest that the mediator should focus her
efforts on helping to empower the parties and on helping them to recognize the
81 1 do not use the terms "negative" and "positive" in any normative sense, and I
certainly would not suggest that I prefer the latter to the former. Instead, I mean to suggest
only that some have developed descriptions that focus primarily on what good practice is
not, and these I label as defining good practice in the negative.
82 E.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1871, 1887 (1997) ("The current
most heated debate concerns the question of whether mediation is facilitative or evaluative
or both."); Maureen E. Laflin, Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption
of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-Mediators, 14 NOTRE DAME JL. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 479, 480
(2000). A similar, though less acrimonious debate has sometimes taken place over the so-
called "facilitative vs. directive" debate regarding a mediator's role with respect to the
development of potential settlement options.
8 3 See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH FOLGER, TRANSFORMATIVE
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFIuCT THROUGH EMPOwERMENT AND RECOGNrTION (1994).
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perspectives of others.84 Because prediction formulation specifically hinges on
the question of settlement or problem-solving, it would surely run afoul of
transformative mediation's focus. 85 For these reasons, proponents of
transformative mediation would not only caution a mediator against signaling
prediction, but also urge her to engage in an almost Zen-like effort not to ask
herself any questions that might lead her to formulate a prediction in the first
instance.
While it is tempting to enter the debate around this particular conception of
mediation, this Article is not the appropriate forum for doing so. For now,
assume that prediction formulation is inconsistent with the vision of mediation
proposed by Bush and Folger. Even if this assumption were true it would only
serve to place prediction outside the realm of accepted practices in one
conception of mediation. It does not follow that prediction is inappropriate in all
forms of mediation in all contexts, unless one is willing to accept a single,
universal definition of "good" mediation practice.
B. Speak No Evil: Do Not Signal Your Predictions Even If You Have
Formulated One
Even among the group of mediation scholars or practitioners who believe
that prediction formulation is either inevitable or useful, there are likely to be
those who nonetheless believe that a mediator should not share or signal her
predictions to the parties. Again, there are at least two different rationales for this
kind of general objection-a utilitarian perspective, and a potential ethical
objection.
From a utilitarian perspective, there will surely be those who formulate
predictions themselves, but conclude that it would not serve the parties' interests
for them to signal or reveal those predictions. Pointing to the uncertain nature of
the predictions, and the even more uncertain nature of the impacts of signaling
those predictions, some will certainly opt to leave prediction signaling out of
their repertoire of mediator practices. As with the response to the utilitarian
84 d. at 55-77. For an interesting analysis of the claims made by Bush and Folger about
mediation's capacity to be transformative, and about the degree to which transformative
mediation achieves its own stated goals any more effectively than traditional problem-
solving approaches to mediation, see generally Jeffrey R. Seul, How Transformative is
Transformative Mediation?: A Constructive-Developmental Assessment, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RFsOL. 135 (1999).
85 See Patricia L. Franz, Habits of a Highly Effective Transformative Mediation
Program, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 1039, 1043-45 (1998) (stating that transformative
mediators must let go of the idea of "settlement" or "resolution" at the end of one or more
mediation sessions in order to focus effectively on party self-determination and growth).
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argument framed above, this objection is potentially correct, but overstated.
Indeed, there will certainly be circumstances in which prediction signaling would
be inappropriate or non-strategic. It does not follow that it will always be
inappropriate or non-strategic. There are conditions in which the parties would
be well served to have access to the information that would be provided through
a prediction.
Even among those who believe that prediction formulation and signaling can
be a useful practice, it is unlikely that anyone would advance an argument that
a mediator should always share her prediction. There are contexts in which it
would be extremely likely to be unhelpful, if not harmful. There are times when
a mediator might prefer to hold her prediction until she has more information.
There will certainly be times when a mediator will collect further information,
causing a slight adjustment in her prediction about the likelihood of settlement,
but she will not want to share her revisions each time she. learns a new piece of
information. There is currently no vision of a mediator who is so wholly
transparent that she signals or shares everything that she is thinking.86 The
practice of signaling predictions, at most, is a specific step a mediator may opt
to take at various points in a mediation.
A second possible objection to the practice of signaling a prediction stems
from a particular conception of mediator ethics. Some may object that the
practice of prediction signaling threatens the parties' self-determination with
respect to the outcome of the mediation. 87 One concern would be that the
mediator may be inappropriately influencing the outcome of the mediation in a
way that threatens the parties' self-determination. Self-determination concerns
generally focus on mediators who induce specific outcomes of some sort, rather
than the mere fact of settlement.88 Nevertheless, there is a slippery slope between
a mediator engaging in behavior designed to produce a specific result, and
861 have argued in different contexts that mediators ought to consider carefully the
merits of increasing the degree to which they share their own thoughts. See, e.g., Moffitt,
supra note 74 (urging transparency about the processes mediators intend to adopt or about
the impact they hope to have on the parties); Michael Moffitt, Mediator Transparency
Workshop, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Santa Fe, NM (June 8, 1999) (materials
on file with author) (suggesting that mediators ought to consider transparency regarding their
observations or diagnoses of the dynamics between the parties).
87 Self-determination is widely recognized as a principle underlying mediation in most
contexts. E.g., Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of
Conduct for Mediators, 2 HAkv. NEGOT. L. REv. 87, 101-03 (1997); Robert B. Moberly,
Ethical Standards for Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida's Mandatory Mediation
Experiment, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. Rnv. 701, 711 (1994).
88 E.g., Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 87, at 103; Robert A. Baruch Bush, The
Dilemmas of Mediation Practice: A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications,
NIDR REPORT 15-19 (1992).
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behavior designed merely to induce a settlement-on any terms. For example,
there have been reports of some mediators who engage in caucusing with parties
in which they try to strong-arm one side into offering more, and then caucus with
the other side and try to strong-arm them into accepting less. If a mediator not
only signaled her prediction regarding the likelihood of settlement, but also
signaled the specific terms of the settlement she thought would ultimately result,
it would raise considerable self-determination concerns. With simple prediction
signaling, as described in this Article, it is not clear that the practice would in any
way violate the ethical norms that have developed around mediation practice.89
Critics may also suggest that the parties' informed consent may be
threatened if they did not expect the mediator to be providing predictive
assessments. Informed consent constitutes a generally accepted pillar of
mediation ethics, and it typically contains at least two components. The first is
the idea that parties must consent to the substance of the outcome. A mediator
cannot impose a particular decision on the parties; they must understand the deal
and accept it or else there is no agreement. The second aspect of informed
consent provides that parties must understand and agree to the mediation process
itself.90 If, therefore, the parties did not believe that a mediator would ever make
a predictive statement and consented to the mediation process under that belief,
then there may be reason to have concern around the degree to which the parties'
informed consent has been protected. Still, this objection does not appear to be
fatal to the practice of mediator prediction. It may suggest that notice should be
given, or that the parties should have an opportunity to preclude predictive
signals from the mediator if they do not want them. The same could be said,
however, of most mediator practices. If the parties do not expect practice X
(whether it is prediction, suggestions of possible settlement outcomes,
evaluations, or caucusing), the mediator may need to negotiate with the parties
about the practice either before the mediation or online, just before the practice
is adopted. Informed consent, by its nature, permits consent under certain
conditions. Therefore, at most, this objection would serve to limit the
circumstances under which mediators engage in prediction.
Finally, there may be those who worry that the practice of prediction
signaling may create a risk that parties will no longer perceive the mediator as
neutral. While it is commonly held that a mediator should maintain "neutrality"
or "impartiality" of some sort, the exact scope or nature of that requirement has
89 There is currently no single statement of mediator ethics. I have argued that even
those ethical frameworks that do exist have suffered some critical deficiencies. See Henikoff
& Moffitt, supra note 83; Panel Discussion: Mediating Ethically: A Critical Perspective at
the Dispute Resolution Annual Conference (Oct. 17, 1999) (audio tape, on file with author).90 Henikoff & Moffitt, supra note 87, at 103-04.
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been less than precise.91 This Article does not intend to address that broader
debate. The concern, however, would be that a party might believe that a
mediator's prediction signal constituted a breach of a duty not to favor one party
over the other. If a mediator signaled an optimistic prediction immediately
following an impassioned series of threats one party made against the other, the
party who made the threats may perceive the mediator's actions as having
undermined the effectiveness of his negotiation strategy. In practice, it seems
likely that virtually any mediator action may have an impact on the outcome in
some way that favors one party, the other, or both. While there may be reason to
question the basic notion of neutrality within mediation, it is not clear that there
are any reasons why prediction signaling would be any more problematic than
a host of other potential mediator practices.
VII. CONCLUSION
Many mediators wonder about the likelihood that the case in front of them
will reach a settlement, and some choose to share their assessment of this
likelihood with the parties. This practice is largely untreated in the traditional
mediation literature, and it raises both utilitarian and ethical questions. This
Article suggests that the impacts of prediction formulation and signaling are
complex enough that it would be difficult to describe a single impact from a
mediator's decision to formulate and signal a prediction. As with many
mediation practices, the mediation community would benefit from a more
thorough exploration of the various issues surrounding prediction and prediction
signaling. There are many circumstances, however, in which mediators can serve
the parties well by formulating and sharing the contents of their predictive
observations.
91 E.g., Leda M. Cooks & Claudia L. Hale, The Construction of Ethics in Mediation,
12 MEDIATION Q. 55, 62-63 (Fall 1994) (describing one conception of the distinction
between "neutrality" and "impartiality"); KEvmi GIBSON, SOME ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDATED DIsPuTE RESOLUTION, 82-129 (University of Colorado, Working Paper No. 92-9,
1992) (outlining a broader spectrum of neutrality issues in mediation and their links to
specific mediator practices and orientations).

